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Security governance influences the quality of strategic decision-making towards ensuring that 
investments in security are not wasted. Security governance involves a range of activities including 
adjusting organisational structures, designating roles and responsibilities, allocating resources, 
managing risks, measuring results, and gauging the adequacy of security audits and reviews. We draw 
on a case study to identify three security issues in an organisation around strategic context. These are 
(1) limited diversity in decision-making; (2) lack of guidance in corporate-level mission statements to 
security decision-makers; (3) a bottom-up approach to security strategic context development. We 
further argue that instead of an approach that is based on risk and controls, organisations should 
address objectives and strategies through developing depth in their security strategic context. 
Keywords: Security Culture, Decentralized Decision Making, Security Strategic Context, Business 
Security Strategies, Information Security Governance. 
Introduction 
In today’s dynamic information security environment, organisations, even those where security 
controls and state-of-the-art technical security are implemented, are struggling to develop strategies 
to address the increases in security attacks (Park et al. 2012; Ahmad et al. 2014). Most of these 
organisations base their information security initiatives on the ISO 27000 series of standards, but are 
still struggling to cope with increases in threats and vulnerabilities.  
While ISO 27000 and related standards introduce a lifecycle model for security management, the 
emphasis is still on the controls needed in information security. Little information is given about 
security objectives, potential implementation strategies for these objectives or about the key aspect of 
accountability arrangements. Also, other than risk assessment, there are few suggestions on how 
organisations should develop security objectives and strategies as part of their security governance 
processes. While this emphasis on controls works well in a reasonably static security environment, in 
today’s ever changing security environment, organisations need to encourage and promote innovation 
in their approach to security management, moving beyond what is prescribed in the current standards 
(Ruighaver, 2008). 
Corporate security governance focuses on “setting the responsibilities and practices exercised by the 
board and executive management with the goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring that 
objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks are managed appropriately and verifying that the 
enterprise's resources are used responsibly” (ITGI, 2009). Understanding how certain characteristics 
of security governance, at the enterprise level and below, influence the quality of strategic decision-
making in information security is an essential step to ensuring that investments in security are not 
wasted. The ability to make well-informed decisions about the many important components of 
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governing for enterprise security, such as adjusting organisational structures, designating roles and 
responsibilities, allocating resources, managing risks, measuring results, and gauging the adequacy of 
security audits and reviews is crucial. Efforts to improve decision making in these areas is mostly 
focusses on corporate security governance (Tan et al., 2003; Carcary et al. 2016).  
Unfortunately, this emphasis fails to effectively address the need to ensure that decision making at the 
lower levels of the enterprise is improved, i.e. the need to establish security governance at the business 
unit level and below. From this point, we will refer to this level of governance as “enterprise-wide 
security governance”, or “security governance”, while referring to “corporate security governance” 
when discussing issues related to board level governance issues.  Hence, while there is evidence of 
reasonable efforts to develop corporate security governance guidelines and frameworks, there is little 
known about enterprise-wide security governance. In particular, about how organisations develop 
their security strategic context, how they decide on security objectives and strategies and how they use 
these to develop their policies and security infrastructures, and the part accountability plays in 
ensuring a streamlined and effective process. Subsequently, this paper addresses the following 
research question: How does information security governance influence the depth of strategic 
context in enterprise information security? 
This case paper reports on one of several case studies of IT services organisations conducted in the 
area of enterprise-wide security governance. Cases were selected on the basis that they were actively 
undertaking security efforts, were relatively stable, were large enough so that governance was an issue, 
and had high reliance on their information systems.  This particular case examines the information 
security function in a business unit of a privately owned, Small-to-Medium Enterprise (SME), with 
security governance decentralized to the IT group. This paper will discuss several of the major issues 
related to ‘enterprise wide security governance’ that we discovered in our in-depth case study as well 
as how these issues affect the security strategic context for this particular organisation.  
Background 
Modern organisations are facing a more complex threat environment. Even though information 
security professionals are aware of, and defend these complex attacks, there are still many high profile 
security incidents. Several experts state that a cause of these incidents is that security personnel are 
too narrowly focused (Wright et al, 2006). For example, in 2013, Vudu, a streaming service in 
California, had customer names, addresses and encrypted passwords stolen. Whilst digitally their 
systems were secure, with firewalls and such installed and working correctly, the data was physically 
stolen when thieves broke into their headquarters and purloined multiple hard drives (Kumparak 
2013). 
Organisations however, are slowly realising the importance of preparedness for these new attacks 
(Tan et al., 2010), by conducting strategic planning around security. Despite this increased emphasis, 
many organisations tend to aim for compliance of standards, hoping that that will be enough to 
protect them from security incidents (Shedden et al., 2010). This approach, however, indicates severe 
shortcomings in the strategic planning of the organisation and points to organisations requiring better 
governance around information security. 
Governance 
For organisations operating in complex and highly dynamic environments, the importance of effective 
governance (how decisions are made) and management (what decisions are made) cannot be 
understated (Peppard, 2007). The traditional view of corporate governance sees the responsibility 
falling to the board and senior executives, with the focus being on the financial well-being of the 
organisation (Konczal, 2011).  This is however, not sustainable due to the highly dynamic business 
environment. Organisations must devolve governance activities down to all levels of the organisation, 
and even to outside entities (ITGI, 2009). From a security perspective, this means that responsibilities 
for governance fall to all employees of the organisation, and to external stakeholders such as auditors 
(Pultorak, 2005; Bergeron 2015). This devolves responsibility to the lower levels of the organisation as 
well as to the senior executives. 
However, having responsibility and feeling responsible are two different issues. With responsibility 
comes accountability. Therefore, an important aspect of any effective governance is how the 
organisation handles accountability for decisions in security management (Borck, 2000). Lack of even 
the simplest accountability processes is a fairly common deficiency in security governance, such as 
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simple feedback loops in which decisions on security are discussed with higher levels of management, 
and the focus is on how the decisions are made (Burke, 2005; Straub et al., 2008). 
Importantly, the delegation of responsibility to those at the lower levels does not preclude the need for 
executive level management support. Knapp et al. (2006) found that top management support for 
information security is a significant predictor of the direction and success of an organisation’s 
information security. Therefore, whereas operational responsibility and accountability primarily lies 
with those at the middle management and lower levels, top/executive management still has clear 
responsibility to visibly demonstrate their support and a high prioritization of information security.  
Security governance should be viewed as a larger management issue that revolves around 
understanding how decisions are made and making consistently good decisions in a complex and 
dynamic environment characterized by distributed decision making (Koh et al., 2005; Ribbers et al., 
2002). Decision makers should be given the right information and the right guidance to be able to 
make quick, decisive and accurate decisions in real time (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006).  
Summary 
From this discussion it is clear that current security practice and compliance with standards is not 
enough to protect organisations. Much research has been completed in the information security 
domain in areas such as policy (Alshaikh et al. 2015; Sommestad et al., 2014; Ifinedo, 2014; Ruighaver 
et. al., 2010; Maynard & Ruighaver, 2006), risk management (Webb et al., 2014; 2016) security 
culture (Okere et al., 2012; Lim et. al., 2010; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Ruighaver et al., 2007), and 
incident response (Ahmad et al., 2015; Ahmad et al., 2012; Shedden et al., 2010). Despite this 
research, organisations are still suffering from incidents.  
Also, there is evidence that organisations are happy with complying with standards and are doing 
“what everyone else is doing.” Given that this is not working, they now must answer the question of 
“what else can we do?” 
Enterprise-wide Security Governance 
For this case study, it is important to make a clear distinction between corporate security governance 
and enterprise-wide security governance as introduced in this paper. From the previous section, it can 
be appreciated that corporate security governance can be understood as governance at a board or 
executive level (Brown & Nasuti, 2005) with its main aims to ensure that security governance is 
promoted and controlled enterprise-wide. Its focus is ensuring controls and reducing or avoiding 
risks. Enterprise-wide security governance as discussed in this paper refers to the controls, 
arrangements, processes or structures that are exercised over the organisation’s security. Specifically, 
these controls, arrangements, processes and structures are focused on improving decision making 
through providing decision makers at all levels with the right information and the right guidance, at 
the right time, to make good decisions about security (Gantz, 2008). 
The field of Information Security is a complex and critical component to an organisation’s success. A 
strategic approach to Information Security aims to transform the IT security function from a set of ad-
hoc activities with an emphasis on technology, to a coordinated approach of principles, behaviours, 
and adaptive solutions that map to business requirements (Whitman & Mattord 2013). As such, those 
responsible are not just senior management but also middle management and others involved with 
the implementation of security strategies. As the practices and methodologies behind Corporate 
Governance and IT Governance are somewhat reliable and time tested and seen to be successful in 
dealing with various organisational issues, it is plausible to suggest that improving Security 
Governance throughout the enterprise may be the key to improving the level of security in 
organisations.  
Frameworks 
The focus of this study is to improve information security decision-making through enterprise-wide 
security governance. The execution of security strategies and timely decisions around these strategies 
occurs at the operations level of the organisation. Subsequently this study is interested in how people 
that implement security perform decision making, with or without organisational guidance. Tan and 
Ruighaver (2005a) point out however, that for decision makers to make quality decisions, guidance 
must be effectively communicated to them in the form of the organisation’s security strategic context, 
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which is contained within artefacts such as security objectives, strategies, tactics and mission 
statements.  
These artefacts are crucial as they outline for decision makers the intent or motivation behind what 
the organisation is trying to achieve with security and the desired end state. For instance, soldiers in 
battle, given a mission, need to understand their commander’s intent. In the military context, the 
commander’s intent is understood as ‘a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the 
desired end state that serves as the initial impetus for the planning process’ (Shattuck, 2000: 66). 
With this understanding, only then can soldiers be proactive, innovative, flexible and aggressive in 
their decisions to achieve mission success. With these artefacts effectively developed, it is then vital 
that they be communicated enterprise-wide, as far down to even the lowest levels. Consequently, this 
will encourage and allow better, more concise and effective decisions to be made. 
Trying to quantify what a good security strategic context is and how one can improve it is a complex 
problem that cannot be adequately answered in a single study. Importantly, however, Peterson et al. 
(2000) and Ribbers et al. (2002) argue that good security strategic context “requires active 
participation and a shared understanding among stakeholders if they are to coordinate activities and 
adapt to changing circumstances”. By developing security strategic context exclusively at the top 
management level, it is likely to result in a lack of diversity across the security strategic context. 
Hence, good security strategic context needs to be developed by different people/committees at 
different levels of the organisation, similar to the development of IT strategic context (Weill & 
Woodham, 2002). 
In this case study we specifically focus on a key aspect of security governance, strategic context (see 
Tan & Ruighaver 2004). Notably, strategic context is also identified as a key component of successful 
IT governance (Weill & Ross, 2004). We also adopt a strategic context model (Broadbent, 2002) 
which we expand so that we look at both the depth and coverage of the security strategic context. 
Depth focuses on the extensiveness of the organisation’s strategic context and encompasses 5 
domains: Security Objectives (mission statements), Security infrastructure, Security architecture, 
Security application needs, and Security investment and prioritization. Coverage focuses on the 
comprehensiveness of the organisational strategic context and includes the security areas defined by 
Tan and Ruighaver (2005b): Network Security, Systems and Data Security, Physical Security, 
Personnel Security, Operations Security, and Miscellaneous Security aspects (Eg. a focus on eCrime, 
and incident handling).  
A matrix of the depth and coverage dimensions helps to determine the strategic context in which an 
organisation is operating in. In the analysis of the case data we use this matrix to assess the scope of 
the organisation’s security strategic context (see Appendix 1 for the analysis). 
The Case Study 
This case study reports on an Australian organisation: MicroComps Limited (MCL). MCL is a 
commercially successful organisation who are market leaders in supply chain management and 
business-to-business e-Commerce solutions. Privately owned, the management structure within MCL 
consists of a management group that reports to a private ownership board (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: MCL’s Organisational Structure 
This board has the final say on the operations of the organisation. In the early days of operating, the 
management group consisted wholly of the ownership board, with the CEO of the organisation being 
the primary owner. Over time, and as the organisation grew, it became necessary to set up a 
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management committee that answers to the board. At this time, the ownership board of MCL took on 
a supervisory role. The CEO, the CFO and senior leadership from each department within the 
organisation together comprise the management committee.  
Department heads report to the ownership board through the CEO and CFO. With regards to the day-
to-day operations of the business, the ownership board has a hands-off approach. However, the board 
still maintains and is actively involved with influencing the strategic direction of the organisation. 
From a governance perspective, the decision-making structures at MCL delegates decision making to 
the division level, allowing each head to formulate and develop their own strategy, as long as it is 
within the organisation’s strategic context (strategic plan).  Thus, the responsibility for all security in 
the organisation falls to the IT Manager, who is responsible for the security governance in the 
organisation. 
Dealing largely with the transaction, processing and ordering systems of other businesses, MCL’s role 
is to receive files (such as orders and payments), translate them into an understandable, common 
language, then deliver the order (as many businesses operate their own backend systems and 
generally not one backend system can talk with every other backend system). A simple way of thinking 
about this process is to visualise what is involved, think the Postal system: receiving, sorting 
(translating), storage and delivery. 
The participants targeted in this case were specifically selected due to their likely involvement in the 
development of security strategies, decision making and in providing input to security decisions. As 
MCL is a SME, the three selected participants were the only personnel within MCL that have security 
responsibilities. The participants were the IT Manager (ITMngr), the Systems Administrator 
(SysMngr) and the Network Administrator (NetMngr). These personnel were intimately involved with 
the implementation of security controls and highly relied upon to make decisions about security and 
to react to security incidents. Of the three, one respondent held the most senior position in the IT and 
information security area while the others reported directly to them. In addition to gaining data form 
the participants the researchers sought documents (such as policies, security strategy etc) and were 
able to observe members of the organisation across a 1-week period with respect to security.  The main 
reason for this was to triangulate data for the research. 
From a security perspective, none of the participants had any exposure or formal training on security 
standards because security had never been something pushed strongly by the organisation. Therefore, 
inconsistencies are evident from the participants’ views on the importance of security to the 
operations of MCL, with some participants stating that security was not important apart from being 
able to cover vulnerabilities, whilst others stated that security was extremely important to the ongoing 
running of the organisation. In MCL security was set up and managed by ITMngr and SysMngr, and 
has a technical focus. 
Overall, ITMngr’s responsibilities are to provide a functional and robust infrastructure, equipment 
and framework for the organisation to enable employees to do their jobs and to allow customers to 
receive their services. ITMngr, like the rest of the organisation is incredibly customer focused, and 
only on very few occasions (and when probed) did he discuss the importance of security and threats to 
his organisations, rather talking about the importance of the customer. Security initiatives at MCL 
have been ‘organically’ grown and ad hoc. Without formal standards or guidance from the 
organisation on how and what to do about security, ITMngr had to formulate his own strategies and 
his objectives (security strategic context), based largely on the wider objectives of availability and 
reliability of systems given to him by the organisation.  
ITMngr acknowledges that security to him (and the organisation) is not so much a priority but a 
necessity and that his approach to security in many ways is reactive. He addresses security through 
the implementation of technical controls and adjusts these in response to security threats and 
incidents. 
NetMngr, is new to the job and has had security delegated to him by ITMngr. Having only just joined 
the organisation, NetMngr is representative of the problem that could arise from the organisation’s 
lack of corporate governance and focus on security. The consequence of a lack of organisational 
guidance on security on the participants is clearly demonstrated in NetMngr. Not only does he have 
little experience with security, he does little regarding security and views security to be less important 
compared to other business functions. Similarly, he is unaware of what goes on concerning security in 
general at MCL. Without formal standards, guidelines, documents, mandates or guidance from the 
corporate governance to inform NetMngr of his responsibilities relating to security, like ITMngr, he is 
left to his own devices.  
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Fortunately for NetMngr, although the organisation has not provided much, if any, formal guidance, 
NetMngr receives sufficient on-the-job guidance from ITMngr, within the team. This ad hoc training, 
is analogous with someone working as an apprentice through a hands-on, learn from experience, on-
the-job mentoring process. NetMngr looks after the local network. Accordingly, he monitors the 
network performance and services, making sure that everything is working as it should and that all 
resources are running at optimum levels.  
MCL has its data centre and all its data, servers and backups outsourced and located off-site. 
Responsibility for that data centre and all external business centres lies with SysMngr. Coming from a 
strong technical background and with previous experience in technological support, administrative 
roles and limited security, SysMngr possesses a great deal of technical knowledge. Like the other 
participants, SysMngr too does not receive much, if any, formal guidance from the organisation on 
what to do, what to secure or how to prioritise security. Like NetMngr, SysMngr gets direction from 
ITMngr, supplemented by his past experiences.  
However, relying on past experiences as a guide for future actions and decisions can also be 
dangerous. In the first place, most people do not recognise the underlying reasons for their mistakes 
or failures. In the second place, the lessons of experience may be inapplicable to the new problems. 
This is where effective security governance to understand how decisions are made and to improve 
decision making is very important. Good decisions must be evaluated against future events, while 
experience belongs to the past (Koontz & Weihrich, 2008). 
Case Analysis and Discussion 
As stated earlier, the analysis of the case data produced a matrix to assess the scope of the 
organisation’s security strategic context (see Appendix 1 for the analysis). From the analysis three 
main themes were identified. These are discussed in this section. 
Diversity in Decision Making is Limited 
At MCL, security does not follow any single security standard, rather, security initiatives were 
improvised and ad hoc, and almost all decisions about the security strategic context have been made 
by the IT Manager. Little or no formal guidance on decision-making rights have ever been explicitly 
expressed or delegated by the organisation. According to participants, the organisation is not 
concerned about what decisions are made, nor about how participants went about their jobs, as long 
as they achieved the availability and reliability of systems and networks. Whilst SYSMngr and 
NETMngr had unwritten guidelines around security there were no formal policies provided. 
At MCL, security governance is mostly decentralised to the IT group by default. Almost all decisions 
and input into decisions, from almost every level of security strategic context is developed and decided 
by the IT Manager with input coming from his team. Unfortunately, inputs are only from his team, 
thus creating an environment of limited social participation and limited diversity in decision making. 
These settings then create the situation where participants rely heavily on their own ingenuity, 
particularly that of the IT Manager to drive security initiatives and to develop security strategies. 
Interestingly, all these actions and initiatives are undertaken without the knowledge and 
understanding that they are actually developing security strategic context.  
Unfortunately, with the lack of formal guidance from executive levels and from other functional areas, 
any discussions, dialogues or consultations, including feedback loops, are internalised within the IT 
department. The input given and received is very insular within the IT department and is limited to 
the experiences of the team members (mainly in systems and networks) and does not adequately cover 
the wider range of security concerns and imperatives. For instance, areas such as physical and 
environmental security and personnel security are lacking in strategies and attention.  
Depth in the technical aspects of security (in network security, systems security and data security) is 
excellent. All levels of depth in the security strategic context matrix (see appendix 1) are adequately 
addressed. This implies that participants at MCL would have good diversity in decision making for 
these specific areas. 
Our analysis of MCL’s security strategic context identifies that the objectives, strategies and certain 
controls developed, employed and actioned at MCL, differ from those recommended by security 
standards such as the ISO 27002 Standard. Whereas the ISO 27002 Standard recommends strategies 
such as: 
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• Control access to critical data and/or servers to ensure availability and reliability 
• Monitor access to directories 
• Real time protection 
• Up-to-date anti-virus software 
MCL has customized these recommendations and developed strategies such as: 
• Maintain a flexible approach to security. Adjust and move in response to things 
• Automatically delete all .exe files on mail server 
• Alerts to be sent when any inconsistencies are noticed 
• Maintain tight and dedicated roles for every server, machine and process so that redundancy 
can be achieved (double up on everything) 
• Training and mentoring. 
Although performed on an ad hoc basis and not through any formal instruction or direction, these 
strategies are specific, customised and flexible to the needs and functions of MCL allowing the 
organisation to view security not as an individual quantified function, but rather as being integrated 
into what they do by necessity. In this sense, as security objectives clarify focus and provide a frame of 
reference for every important aspect of security activity, these objectives and strategies become 
appropriate as high-level statements that would inform the organisation about how security will be 
used to create business value.  
Little Guidance Provided By Corporate Level Security Mission Statements 
The initial setup of security at MCL was ad hoc, fragmented and unplanned with the executive 
management paying scant attention to security, and lacking a holistic perspective of their security 
governance posture. Security is not regarded as being an issue of executive management, until 
something goes wrong. However, even without acceptable levels of formal guidance and assistance, 
participants were delegated the responsibility for security and security decision-making, hence a 
culture of accountability was evident. Consequently, the participants, with the understanding that 
they are held accountable, are in a sense, driven to develop their own security strategic context based 
on their own experiences and always looking to the IT Manager for guidance, which as explained 
earlier has its own pitfalls. 
Further, the participants at MCL were held responsible not only for what decisions were made but also 
on how they made those decisions. For instance, did they seek advice? Participants at MCL were not 
held accountable for compliance to security or of a specific implementation of security. Instead, they 
were held accountable for the effectiveness of security. This is particularly so for ITMngr. As the IT 
Manager, this was his responsibility and he is fully aware that, ‘if you want to lose your job, lose data’. 
As such, ITMngr takes full ownership of security, and in a sense, controls security in an almost 
authoritarian fashion. Given their own inadequacies, the other participants accommodate this 
dictatorship. 
The participants knew they were held accountable by the company’s director for their role in 
information security. Although there was really only one accountability loop between the IT Manager 
and the CEO with active discussions on the state of the company’s security and on how to improve it, a 
secondary feedback and accountability loop existed between the IT Manager and the other 
participants. These accountability and feedback loops, although existent, are about what decisions are 
being made and not about how the decisions are made. Essentially, we believe that the participants 
were actually afraid of losing their jobs, which can be considered more as a ‘motivational influence’ 
than an accountability aspect.  
Without appropriate formal guidance, this scenario could potentially explode and result in many 
‘catastrophic’ decisions being made by the participants. The serious question to consider is whether 
the organisation can ultimately hold the participants responsible if something goes wrong bearing in 
mind that the organisation, due to the lack of formal guidance and attention to security, has never told 
the participants as to how to make good decisions? Or for that matter, what good decisions are. 
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Security Strategic Context Development From The Bottom Up 
Many organisations see Security Governance as a small part of Corporate Governance. While IT 
Governance has become a recognized focus area in larger organisations, these organisations often do 
not give Security Governance the same attention. Hence, organisations still need to realize that just 
like IT, the field of Information Security is a complex and critical component to their organisation’s 
success. As such, those responsible for security are not just senior management but also middle 
management and others involved with the implementation of security strategies (those at the 
operations level of the organisation), and they will similarly need a governance framework for making 
informed decisions about Information Security.  
At MCL, culturally, the focus of security is on the physical systems and network security, an 
environment conducive to bottom-up participation. Participants did not have a framework to work 
with and their experiences were limited. However, whether due to the ‘motivational’ fear of potentially 
losing their jobs, or due to their positive disposition towards security, unbeknown to them, the 
participants have developed their own security strategic context as they were forced to come up with 
their own objectives and controls.  
Their experiences being limited to mainly the technical areas drove them to a narrow focus. Thus, 
frivolity about certain risks and controls exist with certain areas having a heavier focus than others do. 
Areas such as personnel security and physical and environmental security are missing in MCL’s 
security strategy context. However, other areas such as network and systems security are focused on 
heavily. This is indicative of a highly IT-driven, porous security with the security focus and initiatives 
purely on the technical aspects.  
At MCL, due to limited corporate governance support and understanding of the importance of 
security, the participants regarded security as totally unplanned and ad hoc. This attitude was 
inherent across all levels in the organisation, be it at the executive or middle management, business 
unit or lower levels. Coupled with the second imperative of an emphasis on executive controls, the 
significant lack of strategic direction imparted by the organisation has led to a mediocre effort in its 
security strategy development. We submit that this then results in deficiencies in their depth of 
security strategic context. 
Conclusions 
Previous research in Information Security Management highlighted the need for security governance 
as a means to guide decision-making at the level of middle-management and below. This paper 
presents a revelatory case study that identifies three significant shortcomings in the security 
governance of SMEs. These are limited diversity in decision-making, lack of guidance in corporate-
level mission statements to security decision-makers, and a bottom-up approach to security strategic 
context development. From a theoretical perspective, these shortcomings explain how poor security 
governance influences strategic context in enterprise information security. 
Most current information and academic papers on security governance at the enterprise wide level 
promote a centralized decision making model based on, in our experience, an ineffective and old-
fashioned risk management approach to security. The old-fashioned centralized approach is relatively 
simple to manage: It needs almost no security governance enterprise wide (business unit or 
operations levels) as most decisions are made at the corporate level. 
In the current dynamic security environment, this centralized approach does have a major drawback. 
Centralized decision-making will reduce the flexibility and adaptability of an organisation’s security 
posture, making it difficult for the organisation to respond quickly/timely to changes in its security 
environment. 
Further, the lack of input from people at the operations level in the predominantly centralized 
security-planning ethos has stifled innovation in security. This study suggests that organisations 
should empower decision makers at the middle and lower management levels and improve the 
timeliness and effectiveness of security decisions by ensuring that all the governance practices 
identified in the security governance framework are effectively addressed.  
Additionally, this study is about how organisations can transform their approach to security. Instead 
of an approach that is based on risk and controls, the researchers advocate for organisations to 
address objectives and strategies through developing depth in their security strategic context. With 
this alternative approach, it is expected that security policies and guidelines developed will enable 
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decision makers to understand the rationale for controls, rather than simply performing the function 
of security controls. Further, unlike current studies that focus primarily on oversight, our emphasis is 
to understand how decisions are made and not focus on what decisions are made. Therefore, to 
understand how, one needs to know the purpose and rationale for the decision. 
More significantly, with MCL’s security philosophy, the same employee(s) or committee(s) that decide 
on security infrastructure and applications also decide on objectives and security strategies. Hence the 
rationale is that there is no need to communicate those objectives and strategies to the rest of the 
organisation. While accountability arrangements exist, these are still mainly focused on what 
decisions are made and not on how decisions are made, which is what governance is about.  
To create a dynamic, flexible and agile security posture, a more decentralized approach to security 
decision-making is needed. A decentralized approach will need good security governance at all levels. 
To attain this, it is important that the necessary enterprise-wide security governance structures and 
processes are developed and put in place. This ensures that adequate security objectives and security 
strategies are developed and effectively communicated to the decision makers. This, in itself, is 
expected to promote innovation and effective security. 
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Appendix 1: Detailed Analysis of the Breadth and Coverage of The 
Strategic Context 
green and italicized text = activities performed by participants at MCL in accordance with what is 
suggested in the ISO 27002 Security Standard.  
red and bolded text = activities performed by participants additional to those activities suggested in 
the ISO 27002 Security Standard.  
black underlined text = activities proposed by the ISO Security Standard, but no evidence was found 
that would indicate MCL was performing these activities. 






 Security Objectives Security Strategies & Infrastructure 
Network 
Security 
 Ensure availability and reliability 
of network services (general access, 
authentication and access to 
information systems). 
 Compartmentalise and define 
roles. 
 Control access to critical data and/or servers to 
ensure availability and reliability. 
 Manage incoming files. 
 Maintain a flexible approach. Adjust and 
move in response to events. 




 Prevent unauthorized activities.  
 Detect unauthorized activities. 
 Compartmentalise and define 
roles. 
 Regular monitoring of sys and events.  
 Define a security policy outlining unauthorised 
activities. 
 Implement organisational wide use of company 
approved encryption. 
 Provide means for authentication. 
 Maintain a flexible approach.  
 Adjust in response to things. 
 Ad hoc monitoring of network, processes 
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and systems. 
 Informal control of access rights. 





 Prevent damage and interference to 
business premises and information.  
 Prevent loss, damage or 
compromise of assets and 
interruption to business activities. 
 Outsourced to third party. 
 Defined security perimeter erected. 
 Security related hardware and software should at 
all times be protected against tampering to 
maintain their integrity and against disclosure of 
secret keys.  
 Computer and information equipment are 
secured to reduce unauthorised physical access. 
Personnel 
Security 
 Reduce risks of human error, theft, 
fraud or misuse by employees. 
 Ensure users are aware of security 
threats & concerns.  
 Minimise damage, monitor & learn 
from incidents (limited). 
 Ensure that incidents affecting security be 
reported.  
 Define and establish formal disciplinary 
processes. 
 Ensure that employees are aware of security 
threats.  
 Address security responsibilities at the 





 Define procedures for securing 
communications and operations 
facilities. 
 Ensure correct & secure operation 
of information processing facilities. 
 Minimize risk of systems failure. 
 Maintain integrity & availability of 
info processing & communication. 
 Establish strategy for advanced planning and 
preparation to ensure availability.  
 Establish routine procedures for housekeeping. 
 Establish responsibilities & (informal) 
procedures for management on of all information 
processing facilities.  
 Maintain a flexible approach. Adjust and 
move in response to things. 




 Maintain appropriate protection of 
organisational assets. 
 Ensure that information assets 
receive an appropriate level of 
protection. 
 Identify areas of risk in processing cycle. 
 Define protection of company records. 
 All major info assets should be accounted for 
and have an owner. 
 Owners should be identified for all major assets 
and the responsibility for the maintenance of 
appropriate controls should be assigned. This 
accountability ensures appropriate protection. 
 Maintain a flexible approach. Adjust and 




 Comply with legal requirements. 
 Ensure compliance of systems with 
security policies and standards.  
 Business continuity management to 
counteract interruptions to business 
activities and to protect critical 
processes from the effects of major 
failures or disasters. 
 Ensure that the design, operation, use & 
management of systems be within statutory, 
regulatory and contractual requirements.  
 Ensure regular review of Information Systems 
security. 
 Implement a business continuity management 
process to reduce disruption to an acceptable 
level. 
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 Security Architecture Security Application(s) Needed 
Network 
Security 
 Evaluate policies for information 
dissemination & authorisation. 
 Authentication mechanisms. 
 Control of user access to information. 
 Alerts sent when monitoring software 
flags anything. 
 Monitor unauthorised access. 
 Automatic deletion of .exe files on 
mail server. 
 Dedicated role for each server and 
machine. 
 Encryption and certificates. 
 Monitor access to directories. 
 Firewalls. 
 Proxy servers. 
 Home grown monitoring software. 
 Up-to-date anti-virus software. 
 Controls to delete .exe files on mail 
server automatically. 
 SMS and Email alerts. 




 Security and Acceptable use policies to be 
disseminated organisation wide. 
 Systems should be monitored to detect 
deviation from access control policy and 
record monitor able events to provide 
evidence in case of incidents. 
 Identify & verify identity of users. 
 Monitor access to directories by 
unauthorised software/programs. 
 Home-grown monitoring but only of 
things that would disrupt services 
(predominantly software or 
programs, not users). 
 Alerts sent when monitoring 
software flags anything. 
 Monitoring software to monitor employee 
activity on system. 
 Access Control Software (password 
managers & policies to ensure complex 
passwords). 
 Up-to-date anti-virus software. 
 Real time protection. 
 Monitor access files. 
 Monitoring software to monitor 
system and processing health. 
 SMS and email alerts. 






 Secure areas need to be protected by a 
defined security perimeter, with appropriate 
security barriers and entry controls. 
 Special controls may be required to protect 
against hazards or unauthorised access & to 
safeguard support facilities. 
 Protection equipment to reduce the risk of 
unauthorised access to data and to protect 
against loss or damage. 
 Surveillance Technology. 
 Access Control (door entry technology, 
proximity card access, photo identification, 
and biometrics). 
 Monitoring Software with reviewable 
access control logs. 
 Data centre provides redundant power 




 Any breach of security policies will cause an 
initiation of formal disciplinary action. 
 Users should be informed in security 
procedures and correct use of information 
processing facilities. 
 Users made aware of their responsibilities 
at recruitment (security in job 
responsibilities, personnel screening and 
terms of employment). 
 Personnel security policies. 
 Disciplinary policies. 
 Accepted Use Policies. 
 Character Checks. 
 Maintaining personnel security files. 
 Security education & training. 
 Visitor Control. 
 Regular emails sent out to employees 
about laptop security, updating 
antivirus definitions, etc. 






 Develop appropriate operating instructions 
and incident response procedures. 
Disseminated organisation wide. 
 Segregation of duties established to reduce 
risk of negligence or misuse. 
 Users should be made aware of dangers of 
unauthorised/malicious software. 
 Monitoring software to flag errors or 
procedural breeches. 
 Security education & training. 
 All servers and systems have redundancy. 
 Secure backup facilities. 
 Hourly Online backups. 
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 Routine checks on back-up strategy (take 
back-up copies of data & rehearse timely 
restoration, logging events and faults). 
 Routine checks to make sure all 
security updates are installed. 
Data 
Security 
 Important records are identified. 
 Controls are allocated depending on nature 
of application and business impact of any 
corruption of data. 
 Delegate specific responsibilities for 
developing and implementing security 
controls. 
 Responsibilities for the protection of 
individual assets is clearly defined. 
 Disk Encryption. 
 Security Tokens and PINs. 
 Backups. 
 Data Masking. 
 Copy protection. 
 Single sign-on. 
 User groups set. 
 File management processes. 




 Reviews performed against appropriate 
security policies & technical platforms. 
 Information systems should be audited for 
compliance with security implementation 
standards and legal requirements. 
 Business continuity management process 
must be implemented to deal with 
disruption through a combination of 
preventative and recovery controls. 
 Security audits and assessments (limited 
and ad hoc). 
 Backup strategies. 
 Monitoring strategies. 
A note on Security Investment & Prioritisation 
As an SME, resource allocation for security initiatives is scarce and limited. MCL does not have an 
individually allocated budget for security. Security initiatives are drawn out of the IT Budget. Security 
is not prioritised but is seen as an aspect of things that need to be done. Suggestions for investments 
can be made any one of the members of the Managed Services Team as they are responsible for 
security. However, the decision is made by the IT Manager. Although in certain circumstances, the IT 
Manager brings these suggestions up to higher management, this is in no means an attempt to get 
verification. Rather it is more about communication and an effort to keep the executive levels of the 
organization involved in what is happening. 
